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Few battles in military history can be judged both tactical and strategic successes. The 
World War I Battle of St. Mihiel is one of these. Its success can be attributed to many 
reasons: the excellence of the battle plan, the leadership of the generals and field 
commanders, the enthusiasm of the American doughboys, and the lack of German will to 
hold the salient. But above all, its success depended on the great cooperation within the 
newly-instituted American Chief-of-Staff command, and within the recently-formed Allied 
command, both of which allowed for the powerful massing of troops and materials needed 
to defeat a determined enemy fighting a total war. Cooperation produced the massive army 
which formed for the first time at St. Mihiel - an army "nearly four times as large as Grant's 
Army of the Potomac at its maximum strength. three times Napoleon's Grand Army at 
Leipzig, nearly twice the German army at Sedan in 1870, and much larger than either the 
Japanese or Russian armies at Mukden, the largest on record before 1914.~ 1 
On 24 July 1918, the commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies - General John J. 
Pershing, General Henri Petain, and Field Marshal Douglas Haig - met at the headquarters 
of Marshal Ferdinand Foch in Bombon. Marshal Foch proposed new offensives to be 
initiated by the Allied forces in the Great War. "The moment has come to abandon the 
general defensive attitude forced upon us until now by numerical inferiority and to pass to 
the offensive. "2 
Allied morale was higher than it had been for many months. The German spring 
offensives had been blunted, and fresh troops continued to arrive from the U.S. The three 
commanders, however, had serious misgivings concerning offensive action against the 
German Western Front at this time because of the condition of their national armies: 
Field-Marshal Haig: The British Army, entirely disorganized by the events of 
March and April, is still far from being reestablished. 
General Petain: The French Army, after four years of war and the severest 
trials, is at present worn out, bled white, anemic. 
1 David Trask, The AEF and Coalition Wannaking, 1917-1918 {Lawrence, Kansas: University Press 
of Kansas, 1993), 106. 
2 Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal foch, trans. Bentlev Mott (Garden Citv, New York: 
Doubleday. Doran and Company, 1931), 370. • · 
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General Pershing: The American Army asks nothing better than to fight, but it 
has not yet been formed.3 
General Foch assured them that the proper coordination of forces would render the 
objectives practical. A series of operations of limited extent could be rapidly executed along 
the Western Front, preventing the Germans from using their reserves to advantage and 
denying them time to rebuild depleted units. American troops would be responsible for 
carrying out the St. Mihiel offensive, which would return control of the Paris-Avricourt 
railroad to the French and permit a later, larger offensive between the Meuse and Moselle. 
Pershing had sought a larger offensive in the St. Mihiel area, one which would have 
continued westward to include the town of Metz. He was pleased nonetheless with the 
Allied plan. The action forced the creation of the American First Army, and therefore the 
return of most American divisions from the English and French armies. The already depleted 
French and English armies regretted the loss of American troops. Field Marshal Haig was 
especially disturbed by the removal of American troops and privately expressed his dismay: 
"What will history say regarding this action of the Americans leaving the British zone of 
operations when the decisive battle [Amiens] of the war is at its height, and the decision still in 
doubt!"4 
Pershing had fought an often acrimonious battle in order to retain command of his own 
troops. He had pressed for the formation of a distinctly American army from the start, for 
two reasons. His official instructions from Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, required him 
to maintain "the forces of the United States [as] a separate and distinct component of the 
combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." In addition, Pershing and his 
advisors considered the demoralized French and English armies to be caught in a hopelessly 
stalled trench war; they were not fighting to win, but fighting not to lose. Only by taking the 
offensive, and implementing maneuver warfare, could victory be achieved. Pershing believed 
in the "cult of the rifle" and open-field warfare; that is, the infantryman with his rifle and 
bayonet fighting outside the trenches. s 
The American First Army, consisting of fourteen divisions, was officially formed 10 
August 1918, and Pershing officially assumed command 30 August. The "battle of 
command" had been successfully fought, and now Pershing had to solve other grave 
problems: untrained troops, a troubled Service of Supply, and a serious lack of artillery, 
tanks, and aviation.The French provided immediate aid in all categories, but especially in 
equipment. Foch provided ninety-nine batteries of French 75's, fifty batteries of heavy 
'Ibid., 373. 
4 Douglas Haig, The Private Papers of Douglas Haig: 1914-1919, ed. Robert Blake (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1952), 323. 
' John J. Pershing, My Experiences in the World War, voL I (New York: Frederick A. Stokes 
Company. 1931). 38; James J. Cooke, Pershing and his Generals: Command and Staff in the AEF 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), 33, 13. 
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howitzers, and twenty-one squadrons of aircraft. He also provided two artillery staffs, 
because the Americans had only one. Throughout the war, Pershing would depend heavily 
on the Allied High Command to provide whatev.er he lacked, despite his insistence on the 
independence of the American army.'' 
The American First Army's objective, the St. Mihiel salient· L'Hernie to the French -
was a triangular bulge which protruded into Allied lines twenty miles southeast of Verdun. 
The town of St. Mihiel was located at the apex of the triangle. Along the west were the 
heights of the Meuse River, and along the south ran flat, swampy land which became hilly as 
it approached the Moselle River. Along the base of the salient, the Germans had built the 
Michel Position (or Michel Stellung) • twenty miles of modern defensive fortifications 
incorporated into the rugged terrain. This was a "veritable field fortress" with "elaborate 
systems of trenches, barbed-wire entanglements, concrete shelters and machine-gun 
emplacements." These fortifications were arranged in two lines, the first better fortified, the 
second one, five miles back, less so.7 
Both sides had considered this a quiet area along the Western Front since 1915, when 
the Germans had repulsed the French attempt to retrieve it. Many American soldiers began 
their war service here in the Toul, or "Old Home" Sector, for it was a safe area to initiate 
"green" troops. Although the Germans had held the salient since 1914, they were now 
manning it thinly, with probably no more than 23,000 troops. Two divisions had been 
pulled out for the spring offensive, and were not replaced. Of the remaining nine weak 
divisions, seven divisions each held seven and a half miles of front, with the other two 
divisions in reserve. 
Against these weak forces, Pershing planned to send eighteen divisions, consisting of 
almost a half a million men, to attack the 23,000 German soldiers. The American divisions 
each had a rifle strength of 13,000; the 2nd, 5th, and 42nd Divisions each had five riflemen 
for every yard of their division's front. The American concentration of force was great. The 
problem Pershing now faced was how to move this concentration into place without alerting 
the enemy. Petain had suggested a ruse, whereby the Germans would be convinced that an 
attack would occur far to the southeast, at Belfort on the Moselle River. Pershing gladly 
adopted the plan, and sent the unsuspecting Omar Bundy with his VI Corps, along with 
staff officers from six other divisions, to prepare details for an attack in the Belfort area. 
Bundy probably realized his part in the eventual St. Mihiel battle, as he noticed tanks 
moving ostentatiously in his area and heard the great load of nonsensical radio messages 
flooding the airwaves. His liaison with headquarters, Arthur Conger, added a none-too-
subtle flourish to the subterfuge: he typed out the Belfort battle plan in his hotel room, 
threw the carbon in the trashcan and went out for a walk. When he returned, the carbon 
was gone.8 
"Trask, 101. 
1 Ibid., I 02. 
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However, the objective of surprise ultimately failed, and the enemy sent three 
additional divisions into the St. Mihiel area. Pershing expressed his dismay at the lack of 
security: "Unfortunately, both the French and the Americans have talked, and it now seems 
certain that the enemy is aware of the approaching attack." The best security in the world 
could not have concealed the massive quantities of troops and materials flooding the Allied 
area surrounding the salient, and the inexperience of hundreds of staff officers also 
aggravated the problem of security. Each staff officer, feeling that his part in the battle was 
momentous, disobeyed orders forbidding battlefield visitation. The roads leading to the 
battlefield from headquarters were congested with officers who wished to personally view the 
ground over which their troops were to fight. Inexperience also complicated seemingly 
simple orders. Officers in charge of the movement of supplies and munitions to the area 
were ordered to conceal these goods; inspectors would then check the location and 
concealment methods. One inspector required a supply officer to "conceal" his ammunition 
dump with paulins, even though only white paulins were available. This huge target was 
soon bombed by the enemy, and the American First Army lost its largest single supply of 
munitions.9 Eddie Rickenbacker summarized the security problem: 
Every taxi driver or waiter in Paris could have told one just where the Americans 
were concentrating ... The number of guns, the number of troops and just where 
they were located, how many aeroplanes we had ... were discussed by every man on 
the streets. 8 
The Germans had indeed noticed much movement in front of General Max von 
Gallwitz's army group, between St. Mihiel and the Moselle. As early as the end of August, an 
American offensive was expected. Although General Headquarters had reinforced the sector 
with three additional divisions, Quartermaster-General Erich von Ludendorff recommended 
the evacuation of the salient. Local commanders, however, were optimistic about their 
strength, and General Headquarters was reluctant to evacuate the sector because of the 
industrial areas lying behind it. Therefore, orders to withdraw behind the Michel Position 
were not given until 8 September. Only advance guards were to remain in the most forward 
trenches. Lieutenant General Georg Fuchs, commander of the majority of German troops in 
the sector, ordered the withdrawal of heavy artillery pieces and the destruction of buildings, 
bridges, roads and water supplies in preparation for abandoning the salient. The German 
army was doing precisely what Marshal Foch had earlier predicted to General Pershing: "The 
Germans would fall back from St. Mihiel at the first sign ... " of an Allied assault." 
8 Meirion and Susie Harries, The Last Days .of Innocence (New York: Random House, 1997), 340. 
9 Pershing, Experiences, vol. 2, 249; George C. Marshall, Memoirs of My Services in the World War, 
1917-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1976), 131. 
8 Harries, 341. 
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When the Americans received reports of German withdrawal, they sought to use Fuchs' 
situation to their advantage, but they had to act quickly. Pershing called a staff meeting on 
the evening of II September to discuss the poss.ibility of carrying out the attack the next 
day. General William "Billy" Mitchell, was surprised that some of the "Old fossils" were 
hesitant to exploit the situation of the German army: 
Our Chief Engineer recommended that we delay the attack because there had been 
considerable rain. This, he said, had held up our light railways used for getting up 
artillery ammunition. The question of adequate water for some of the troops would 
be difficult and a thousand and one things which could not be done were 
mentioned. 10 
Meanwhile, First Army headquarters had been revising Pershing's original • and larger -
August Plan, producing the September Plan for the attack on St. Mihiel. (See map.) General 
George Marshall and Colonel Walter Grant had devoted themselves exclusively to the 
September Plan since 30 August. Their work was constantly interrupted by field 
commanders seeking "minor" changes that they believed would simplify their troops' 
battlefield orders. Their requests seemed entirely reasonable to them, but they did not 
realize the complications caused by even the most minute alteration. The massive 
concentration of troops imposed a rigidity on all formations, that the officers were 
unaccustomed to from their earlier military experiences. Changes were often made, but they 
came from above and not from below. When Marshal Foch and General Pershing decided 
on a minor change of order, that "inch at the top became a mile at the bottom." 11 
The battle plan, suggested by Pershing and detailed by Marshall and Grant, met the 
objective of simplicity. A first assault would be made on the south face of the salient, and a 
secondary against the west face. Holding attacks and raids would also be made against the 
nose of the salient to hold the enemy in place, Major General Joseph Dickman's IV Corps 
(89th, 42nd, and lst Divisions) was assigned the principal attack against the south face. To 
the right of the IV Corps, Major General Hunter Liggett's I Corps (82nd, 90th, 5th, and 2nd 
Divisions) would make a supporting attack. The V Corps under Major General George H. 
Cameron (26th, part of the 4th, and the French 15th Colonial Divisions) was assigned to 
strike eastward across the heights of the Meuse. Then it was to link with Dickman's troops, 
cutting off the defending German units. The French II Colonial Corps would advance 
northeasterly, in order to support the attack on its right and left flanks. The reserve 
consisted of three divisions: the 35th, 80th, and 9lst Divisions. A total of 550,000 
• Trask, 104; Erich von Ludendorff, Ludendorffs Own Story, August 1914-November 1918, vol. I 
(New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1919), 361. 
German sources disagree conceming who ordered the withdrawal and when. Fuchs maintains that he 
ordered the withdrawal without waiting for superior orders. 
10 Harries, 34 L 
11 Marshall, 134. 
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American and II 0,000 French Troops were to attack 23,000 German and Austrian troops 
in the salient. The Allied troops would have over 3,000 artillery weapons at their disposal -
most of which were contributed by the French, and I500 aircraft - most of which were 
contributed by the British and French. 12 
The greater part of the St. Mihiel salient was surrounded by dense entanglements of 
barbwire. The staff had thought that these could be crushed by heavy tanks. However, on 
28 August General Haig withdrew his promise of supplying heavy British tanks for the St. 
Mihiel battle. The staff now faced a serious problem. The troops attacking from the south 
would need fifty-five breaches in the seven-mile front - eight gaps per mile. The staff 
estimated that army gunners would need 1600 rounds of ammunition to make sufficient 
gaps in the wire which was sixty-six yards deep. It would not be possible to bring a sufficient 
amount of ammunition to the front in the short time remaining, and the bombardment 
would require eighteen hours - totally destroying any sense of surprise. Pershing's surprise 
attack would become a battle of attrition. 
Three proposals for dealing with the wire were considered: first, to precede the infantry 
advance by eighteen hours of artillery fire, second, to precede the infantry advance by five 
hours of artillery fire, which would not destroy the wire, but would demoralize the enemy 
and inspire our troops, and third, to launch an infantry attack without any prior 
bombardment. For a time, the last proposal was the most popular with the greatest number 
of the staff. Grant and Marshall were horrified. The experience of recent Allied battles had 
demonstrated the great butcher's bill for sending troops into wire entanglements. In the end, 
Pershing decided on four hours of preliminary bombardment on the southern face of the 
salient, and seven hours on the western side. 
The final drafts of the special instructions, or annexes, to the battle order for the 
engineer troops, supply services, signal communications, intelligence service, control of road 
traffic, handling of prisoners, and others, were prepared by Grant and Marshall after 
receiving them from the various Chiefs of Services. Hospitalization for 50,000 casualties -
the standard number for an operation of this size -was prepared. 
A heavy rain fell throughout the night of the eleventh. The artillery preparation began 
at OIOO on I2 September. The 2,971 guns of the American First Army opened in unison. 
"The enemy's attack struck ... by surprise," stated the official German report later. Because 
their intelligence had predicted an offensive on the fifteenth, the American attack caught 
German artillery on the road, and some companies had already installed themselves behind 
the Michel Position. However, the remaining Germans did not immediately abandon their 
salient. At 0420, Fuchs informed higher command that "the evacuation would not be begun 
as there were no compelling reasons for such action at that time." 13 
The infantry on the south face advanced at 0500, behind the rolling barrage of 267 
light tanks commanded by Lieutenant Cplonel George C. Patton, Jr. The weather was 
12 Trask, I 06. 
" Harries, 343; Ibid. 
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clearing, and the heavy fog which had covered the Woevre plain was giving way to brilliant 
sunlight. The Southern Force - all divisions of I Corps, and the 42nd and 89th Divisions of 
IV Corps - pivoted on the Moselle River. These six divisions swung to the right in a twelve-
mile arc toward the town of Vigneulles. The First Division of IV Corps, on the left of the 
other six divisions, advanced northwest to meet up with troops of V Corps while protecting 
the left flank of its own IV Corps. The Western Force moved at 0800, giving the Southern 
three hours head start. The 26th Division met up with the First Division of IV Corps. The 
Fourth Division, northernmost of the Western Force, remained in place. To its right was the 
French 15th Division, which moved to the edge of the heights of the Meuse in order to 
protect the left flank of the 26th. The Central Force, the French 11 Colonial Corps, followed 
the retreating enemy. All divisions advanced with little difficulty, supported by an aerial 
division of 1400 British, French and American planes under the command of Colonel 
William Mitchell. 
General Pershing, along with Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, watched the action 
from the old fort of Gironville on a height to the south. The general's plan was executed with 
perfection that day. By nightfall, the American divisions heading toward Vigneulles were 
only ten miles apart. The only difficulty had been the poor conditions of the roads, which 
slowed the arrival of the horse carts and the trucks bringing ammunition and rations to the 
front. The next few days would be spent mopping up and securing the salient. 
General Pershing was relieved to see the rapid progress of the troops across the 
barbwire entanglements. After the battle he would learn of the methods employed by the 
troops in dealing with these barriers. Special pioneer detachments and engineers had been 
sent to accompany the first wave of troops and cut the wire with long Bangalore torpedoes 
and wire cutters. The troops, however, became impatient with the slow progress, and merely 
stepped over the wire. Some regiments even brought along their own chicken wire to lay 
over the barbwire, forming a "carpet" that allowed a line of troops to quickly walk over the 
wire, The cutting of the gaps took almost the entire day, but these gaps remained a necessity 
for the passage of artillery, trains and reinforcements. So amazing was the soldiers' passage 
that few believed it. Marshal Petain believed the story, and sent about BOO incredulous 
French officers and noncommissioned officers to see how the American soldiers had crossed 
an area previously considered impassable. When the officers saw the evidence on the 
ground, they believed - and commented that the American soldiers were aided by the 
enormous size of their feet. 14 
Meanwhile, General Fuchs had recognized that his forces were in danger of being cut 
off. At 1200, he ordered the retreat of the Mihiel Group to the Schroeter Position, but then 
quickly decided to send them all the way back to the Michel Position without making a 
stand at the Schroeter. At 0400 on 13 September, Fuchs had completed the retreat. Shortly 
after, the first elements of the First Division of IV Corps and the 26th Division of V Corps 
met at Vigneulles. Fortunately for the Germans, Pershing had given his field commanders 
very little decision-making power. Therefore, when the commanders could have pushed 
H Marshall, 147. 
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ahead more quickly, they did not; and Pershing, for his part, was unable to get his orders 
through to the commanders when he realized an early junction could be made at Vigneulles. 
This delay allowed thousands of Germans to escape capture. 
By the afternoon of 13 September, the Americans had reached all their objectives: the 
First Army had seized the Paris-Avricourt railway and straightened out the enemy line. 
Pershing reported the capture of almost 16,000 prisoners, 443 guns, 752 machine guns, and 
large amounts of light materiaL American casualties totaled 7,000 for those first two days, 
but 3,000 more casualties would occur during the consolidation of the salient after 13 
September. Casualties were 40,000 less than headquarters expected. All activities in the area 
ceased after 16 September, because the First Army had to move quickly to be in position for 
the Meuse-Argonne battle, which was to begin on 26 September. 
Ludendorff and von Gallwitz, however, thought the Americans would continue the 
attack, and wished to reinforce the ranks. But when von Gallwitz asked Field Marshal Paul 
von Hindenburg for reinforcements on 17 September, the latter angrily replied, "I am not 
willing to admit that one American division is worth two German. Whenever commanders 
and troops have been determined to hold their position and the artillery has been well 
organized, even weak German divisions have repulsed the mass attacks of American 
divisions and inflicted especially heavy casualties on the enemy."'' 
Some of Pershing's staff believed that the St. Mihiel offensive should have been 
extended to Metz, in spite of the commitment of troops to the Meuse-Argonne sector. This 
was also Pershing's original plan before the Allied command truncated it. George Marshall, 
although opposed to further attacks because of Foch's orders, nonetheless believed an assault 
on Metz would have been successful. "[T]here is no doubt in my mind but that we could 
have reached the outskirts of Metz by the afternoon of the 13th, and quite probably could 
have captured the city on the 14th, as the enemy was incapable of bringing up reserves in 
sufficient number and formation to offer an adequate resistance."16 
The evening of the thirteenth, a meeting was held at headquarters to decide whether 
the attack should be resumed, and a move made toward Metz. Marshall and Grant issued a 
statement opposing the action: the assault had lost its momentum, and the enemy had been 
given time to regroup his scattered forces. American forces had stopped short of the 
Hindenburg Line, and out of range of the heavy artillery of the permanent fortifications of 
Metz. Twelve additional hours would be necessary to draw up plans and deliver them to the 
front, providing the enemy with even more time to reinforce his position. At this time, an 
assault on Metz would be extremely difficult and would produce heavy casualties. 
Furthermore, American troops would be unable to reach their assigned positions for the 
Meuse-Argonne offensive in time. Pershing decided to follow the original plan. Stabilization 
" James H. Hallas, Squandered Victory: The American First Army at St. Mihiel (Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger, 1995), 222. 
16 Marshall, 146. 
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of the front proceeded quickly, and the troops intended for the Meuse-Argonne were sent on 
their way. 17 
Could Metz have been assaulted successfully( Pershing and Marshall believed so; others 
believed not. Everyone agrees that St. Mihiel was a tactical victory, but was it a strategic 
loss? Could a successful Metz offensive have ended the war earlier, and could it have 
prevented the 120,000 Meuse-Argonne casualties? The strategic value of a successful Metz 
offensive rests on three subarguments: the value of the railway line behind the Meuse-
Argonne front versus the value of the railway line behind Metz; the real strength of the 
Michel Position and Metz, and above all, the American army's ability to carry out the 
massive Metz operation on its own. 18 
The first two arguments depend on the third: the American Army's ability to 
successfully assault Metz, and then successfully take the Longuyon-Sedan railway line and 
the Briey Iron Basin - both twenty miles beyond Metz. This is not an objective the 
American Army could have achieved, for two reasons. First, the American Army depended 
heavily on both British and French materials and manpower. Would Foch, Petain and Haig 
have committed their supplies to the Metz offensive? No. They strongly disagreed with 
Pershing's inclusion of Metz in his St. Mihiel offensive. The cooperation and coordination of 
materials and manpower by Foch, Petain, Haig and Pershing produced the success of St. 
Mihiel. Second, the recently-formed American Army consisted of a great number of 
partially-trained, inexperienced troops. They were not ready for a major offensive against a 
position the enemy was determined to hold. St. Mihiel had been an excellent training 
ground for these troops, because the Germans had already decided to withdraw from the 
salient. For that reason, the battle has been referred to as "the Americans relieving the 
Germans."1q General Hunter Liggett cites the inexperience of the troops and other reasons to 
support his belief that a Metz assault would not have been successful: 
The possibility of taking Metz and the rest of it, had the battle been fought on the 
original plan, existed, in my opinion, only on the supposition that our army was a 
well-oiled, fully coordinated machine, which it was not as yet. If all the divisions 
had been battle-tempered and battle disciplined as were the First, Second and 
Forty-Second, which again they were not, it might have been worth while to make 
the attempt, despite the facts that the rainy season had begun and that an advance 
would bring our right under the guns of Metz, our left under the Meuse heights 
north of Verdun. 20 
17 Ibid. 
18 Hallas, 260-5. Hallas, in general. makes the three subarguments. I have added "on its own; to 
emphasize the fact that the AEF most certainly did need the Allied anns, staff and training to cany out 
this offensive. 
1
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The American Army's ability to take Metz, thus depended on its ability to supply its 
own troops and to provide more training for its troops - and as General Liggett has also 
mentioned - its ability to overcome the problems of the rainy season and terrain. Could the 
American Army have accomplished this in such a short time without the cooperation and 
coordination of the Allied forces? No. The St. Mihiel offensive, in its limited but cooperative 
form, did most certainly offer both a military and moral strategic advantage: the German 
threat to the rear of the Meuse-Argonne offensive was eliminated, and more importantly, the 
morale of the war-weary Allies was dramatically increased. As Pershing himself maintained: 
''The St. Mihiel victory probably did more than any single operation of the war to encourage 
the tired Allies. Mter years of doubt and despair, of suffering and loss, it brought them 
assurance of the final defeat of an enemy whose armies had seemed well-nigh invincible."21 
20 Hallas, 263. 
21 Pershing, vol. 2, 273. 
